TOP SECRET

nn/350:471 445 - 1) 5H - 12-5/5 3 material

January 21, 1959 material Reported January 21

Synopsis of State and Intelligence material reported to the President

IRAN-USSR
CUBA
Meanwhile, State Department,
With regard to our military missions, our Charge told Minister of State Agramonte that we were prepared to discuss dates and terms for their withdrawal if this was what the Cuban Government wanted.
TEST TALKS

TURKISH-IRANIAN OBJECTIONS TO BILATERALS


Warren notes that both Iran and Turkey have objected to the failure

TOP SECRET

3 (1)(3)(4)(5) N3C 9/12 153; CIA 12/15/5 N3C 9/12 153; CIA 12/15/5 of our craft bilateral treaties to refer to Article 1 of the Baghdad Pact. They feel that the treaties should include a clear and significant commitment by the U.S. towards the pact regional members in order to obtain favorable impact on public opinion. They also complained that the proposed text appeared to confine our cooperation to planning only. Warren urges that we go as far as possible in accepting the new Iran-Turkey text which was tabled at the meeting and then inform the regional members that this is it.

Meanwhile, we have informed interested posts that our objectives at the Karachi meeting are to: (1) increase the members' awareness of their mutuality of interest; (2) reaffirm our support of Pact collective security efforts, both military and economic; (3) emphasize that our aid programs enhance the members' defense capability and economic development; (4) exchange views on area developments without committing ourselves on intra-area problems; (counsel restraint with respect to Iraq; (6) urge amicable relations with Afghanistan in order to reduce its dependence on the USSR; and (7) dissuade the Pact from injecting itself into intra-area disputes.

MIDDLE EASTERN SITUATION



FRENCH VIEWS ON BERLIN ACCESS

De Gaulle's diplomatic adviser has stated that de Gaulle is absolutely firm in his intention to resist force by force. However, de Gaulle feels that to make an advance commitment of a political nature under circumstances which cannot be foreseen in advance is vastly different from making broad strategic plans which would go into effect semi-automatically should the allies be faced with sudden threat of all-out



war. De Gaulie insists that the French have an opportunity to evaluate the situation it, the light of circumstances at the time. Houghton recomments that we retrian temporarily from further personation.

